Note: As of this original posting on June 15, Governor Hobbs had not yet signed HB2995 into law; she did sign it on June 22, 2026, so this law becomes effective June 22, 2026.
HB2995 makes some massive changes in Arizona’s domestic violence laws as they relate to family court proceedings. This law drastically changes existing law which is ARS 25-403.03. Reference to “previous statute” or the “pre-2026” version of ARS 25-403.03 in this post means the statute as it existed prior to the passage of HB2995; reference to HB2995 (or “the bill”) means the changes to 403.03 which will become effective immediately when Governor Hobbs signs the Bill, which was transmitted to her on June 11, 2026.
HB 2995 is referred to as the “Alec and Lydia Act”. Alec and Lydia Mater were children who were horrifically shot and killed by their father who was exercising parenting time with them after his divorce from their mother. During the divorce, father had exhibited psychiatric issues including reporting suicidal thoughts. Despite father’s issues, statements, and threats, he was granted unsupervised parenting time with the children, leading to the tragedy of their deaths and his own suicide.[1]
HB2995 is a structural overhaul to Arizona’s family court definitions, findings, and requirements for family court cases involving domestic violence. The previous statute, ARS 25-403.03 and this update to that statute include protections for domestic violence victims and presumptions that must be followed in family court where domestic violence is a factor. The bill creates substantial new procedural obligations for courts when trying these cases, and narrows judicial discretion.
A major improvement in HB2995 is that the new language clears up some unfortunate language in 403.03A that attempted to describe what “type” of domestic violence calls for limitations regarding children. ARS 403.03A began with a confusing statement mentioning both “significant domestic violence” as well as “a significant history of domestic violence”. The difference between those two phrases has been the subject of several appellate cases and caused much consternation about what standard a person must meet in order to prove the significance of domestic violence. To make things more confusing, the prior statute listed a legal standard for the second clause (“significant history”) but did not state what legal standard of proof applied for the first clause. Simply put, ARS §25-403.03A in its old form was very hard to interpret.[2]
The changes to 403.03 start with a public policy declaration that domestic violence (DV) is contrary to a child’s best interests, notwithstanding § 25-103(B)’s general statement that “substantial, meaningful, frequent and continuing contact” with both parents is presumed to be in a child’s best interests.
The court is directed to assign the highest priority to the personal safety and physical, mental, and emotional well-being of both the child and the domestic violence victim. The “highest priority” language overrides the § 25-103 parental access presumption when domestic violence is present. The statute then goes on to define when a court must find that DV is present.
Mandatory Written Findings by the Court
Somewhat surprisingly, the former statute did not require specific written findings resolving domestic violence allegations before entry of a legal decision-making or parenting time order.
HB2995 now requires the court, when entering an order with findings about DV allegations, to make specific written findings on the record addressing (at least) three things after an evidentiary hearing:
(1) a thorough description of the evidence that justified or prevented a finding that domestic violence occurred;
(2) a thorough explanation of why a perpetrator of domestic violence did or did not rebut the mandatory presumption; and
(3) a thorough explanation of why the court’s chosen precautions are in the child’s best interests.
This Subsection creates a checklist for the court’s findings which will allow an appellate court to either uphold or overturn rulings involving DV. This Subsection also changes the general requirement that the court is not required to make written findings in temporary orders (as stated in Gutierrez v. Fox, 2017). With these changes, courts now must make written findings in all proceedings involving allegations of DV including temporary orders and modification proceedings.
Evidentiary Standard for Proving Domestic Violence (New Subsection C vs. Prior Subsection C)
The pre-2026 version of 25-403.03 requiredthe court, in determining whether domestic violence occurred, to consider “all relevant factors” including findings from other courts, police reports, medical reports, DCS records, shelter records, school records, and witness testimony. As noted above, 403.03A had a confusing statement of the legal standard to be applied by the court when it stated: “joint legal decision-making shall not be awarded if the court makes a finding of the existence of significant domestic violence . . . or if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a significant history of domestic violence.”
HB 2995 cleans up the court’s consideration of a domestic violence claim by abandoning the previous two different categories (significant DV vs. a significant history of DV), and adds these new provisions.
- Preponderance standard is expressly stated. The legal standard for proving domestic violence is now established as preponderance of the evidence.
- Corroboration is not required. HB2995 provides that corroboration from exhibits or witness testimony of another person is not required. As this was not addressed in 25-403.03, those accused of DV were free to argue that lack of corroboration should lead to a rejection of the DV claim.
- “Other acts” evidence is broadly admissible. HB2995 allows consideration of other acts of domestic violence against any person that tend to prove coercive control, even if those acts have been previously litigated, predate the last decree, or could have been litigated at another time or place. As this was not addressed in 25-403.03, those accused of DV were free to make evidentiary objections (often sustained) that res judicata-type arguments prevented the court from considering other incidents or that other incidents were time-barred.
- Medical/behavioral health records are admissible if the victim waives privilege, and shelter records are admissible with the victim’s informed written consent — both with clearer consent-based frameworks than the existing statute.
Arguably, all of these changes make it easier for the alleged victim to prove DV has occurred, and harder for the alleged abuser to keep evidence out on procedural grounds.
NOTE re use of certain terms in this post—“victim”, “abuser”, or “batterer”— are used in this post only for clarity of which party is being referred to and are not considered to be legally defined terms.
Rebuttable Presumption — Scope and Limits on Courts (New Subsection D vs. Prior Subsection D)
The prior version of 25-403.03(D) created a rebuttable presumption against awarding sole or joint legal decision-making to a parent who committed an act of domestic violence, and lists three significant DV acts that trigger the presumption:
- serious physical injury/sexual assault
- reasonable apprehension of serious physical injury
- a pattern of behavior supporting an ex parte order.
Previously, that presumption did not apply if both parents were found to have committed domestic violence.
The Mandatory Presumption stated in Subsection D is: IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT A PARENT HAS COMMITTED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THERE IS A MANDATORY REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT AN AWARD OF LEGAL DECISION-MAKING OR PARENTING TIME TO THAT PARENT IS CONTRARY TO THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS.
So, with the HB2995 changes, in all cases where a finding of DV is made by the court, the abuser-parent starts with a presumption of no parenting time and no decision-making rights. The abuser-parent’s only option is to rebut the presumption as described in Part 2.
[1] It remains unknown to this author whether father was granted unsupervised parenting time as the result of agreement between the parents or by a court order granted after a hearing, and if there was a hearing, what evidence of father’s psychiatric issues or domestic violence was presented to the court.
[2] See, inter alia, Engstrom v. McCarthy, DeLuna v. Petitto, Imatdinov v. Imatdinov.